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CHALLENGING MEDICAL-LEGAL NORMS: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVACY IN PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL AND 
FAMILIAL GROUP RIGHTS IN GENETIC INFORMATION
Graeme T. Laurie LL.B. Ph.D.*
2INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been spilled discussing the ramifications of genetic advances for individuals, 
communities, and society at large. A central concern has been the problem of regulating access 
to, and control of, genetic information that has been produced as a result of rapid progress in the 
fields of genetic research and genetic testing. To date, discussion has rightly focused on the uses 
to which genetic test results should be put, and, indeed, on the logically prior question of 
whether genetic information should be sought at all in certain circumstances. Debate has, 
however, tended to polarize the issues under scrutiny, setting the individual against the state or 
other interested parties such as insurers or employers. Moreover, from the perspective of the 
individual, the interests that have been identified as being at stake have centred on the autonomy 
of persons and the “right” that they have to control personal genetic information. While these 
are important starting points, it should be realized that the discourse barely has begun on the 
appropriateness of social, ethical, and legal responses to the novel challenges that are thrown up 
by such scientific advances. This article offers an alternative perspective on these challenges. In 
particular, three aspects of the debate are considered. 
First, focus is placed on assessing the range of interests that are at stake when genetic 
information is generated, and in particular the interests of family members in shared familial 
genetic information are examined. It is the fact that genetic information relates to a group of 
persons and not simply to one individual that sets genetic information as a class apart from other 
forms of medical information. This requires us to consider the group dynamics of managing and 
controlling shared information, and the possible rights and interests that might flow from a 
“group” claim to familial data. These in turn must be seen in contra-distinction to the more 
traditional atomistic, autonomy-based approach, which focuses on the rights and interests of the 
individual from whom the genetic information initially has been obtained (the proband). 
Second, the nature of the interests in issue must be examined to determine precisely 
3which factors, values, perceived benefits, and harms should be weighed in the balance when 
deciding how genetic information should be handled. This becomes particularly important if one 
adds the interests of family members to the equation. At first blush, the most obvious interest 
focuses on knowing genetic information, and, on this basis, arguments for a “right to know” are 
frequently founded. However, the potential existence of a “right not to know” genetic 
information, which may protect both personal and familial interests, also merits analysis. Only 
then can a proper assessment be made of the appropriateness of any use of the information in 
question. It is submitted that proper recognition of the interest in not knowing is urgently needed. 
Furthermore, in order properly to protect such an interest by legal or other means, a paradigm 
shift in medical-legal norms is required. This is revealed by an assessment of the role of more 
traditional concepts, such as autonomy and confidentiality in providing a suitable basis on which 
to found the claim not to know. As will be argued, these are wanting in the present context, and a 
viable alternative must be sought.
In the third and final section of this article a unique view of privacy is offered as a means 
of recognizing and protecting the full gamut of personal and familial interests surrounding 
genetic information, and most particularly, the interest in not knowing information in certain 
circumstances. The benefits of this concept are manifold, and its particular value for legislative 
purposes in designing ethically appropriate genetic privacy laws will be examined in the shadow 
of legislative proposals to protect genetic privacy to date. 
I.  GENETIC INFORMATION: WHAT DO WE KNOW, AND WHAT DO WE NEED 
TO KNOW? 
In seeking an appropriate legal response to advances in genetics, it is trite to observe that 
we require laws that are informed by ethical debate, that are morally sound, and that reflect as 
largely as possible our common societal values. These parameters must never be forgotten or 
4obscured in the legislative process, and they require, first and foremost, that we proceed in an 
informed manner whereby we are apprised of the functional utility of genetic information. The 
starting point then in deciding whether the promised benefits of genetic advances are truly 
desirable is to understand the limits of what information of this kind can allow us to do, and 
perhaps more importantly, what it cannot allow us to do. 
A. The Uniqueness of Genetic Information (Individual v. Family)
Information is a unique entity. The same information can be used co-temporaneously by 
a large number of persons for a wide range of ends, and yet the essential character of that 
information may remain unchanged. Furthermore, a particular use by one person or group of 
persons does not preclude others from engaging in other uses of the information, for no two 
uses are mutually exclusive. Traditionally, when we have asked where the control of information 
should be located and how that control should be exercised, the answer has been that the person 
to whom the information belongs or to whom it relates should exercise that control; that is, the 
source of the information. In the genetic sphere, however, such an answer is simplistic and 
unsatisfactory. 
As has been pointed out, genetic information differs from other forms of medical 
information because it pertains to a range of people and not solely to one individual. In this 
respect, it gives rise to special problems concerning how the information should be gathered, 
stored, accessed and used. While one might choose to locate control of a genetic sample with the 
person from whom it has been taken,1 one cannot ignore the fact that genetic information 
derived from the sample also reveals information about the relatives of the sample source. And, 
these persons can base a claim to the information on precisely the same grounds as the source; 
namely, “I have a claim because it is about me.” Moreover, the ends to which this information 
can be put may affect relatives in much the same way as they can affect the life of the person 
who has been tested. To locate the control of this information solely with the proband, 
5therefore, might seem to many to be an inadequate response to concerns about how information 
of this sort should be treated.        
B. The Distinction Between Family History and Test Results (Specific v. Abstract 
Knowledge)
It is sometimes claimed that a family history is simply genetic information in a different 
guise, and therefore that a genetic test result is no different to a known family history. Yet, family 
history is abstract knowledge that has been tainted by bad or failing memories, lack of accurate 
data about why someone has become ill or died, and by an absence of understanding about the 
pattern of disease in a family pedigree. In contrast, genetic test results can offer a high degree of 
specificity, both in terms of predicting the likelihood of disease in other family members and in 
terms of putting flesh on the bones of a suspicion that has heretofore been unconfirmed. 
Specific information brings with it a number of realities that can include a degree of “certainty” 
about future ill-health or even the mode and manner of one’s own death. These realities can 
impact an individual’s self-perception in ways that family history cannot, for, with the latter, one 
has the comfort of having lived with an abstract threat that has always manifested to someone 
else. 
Specific knowledge of one’s own genetic constitution, especially when it is accompanied 
by knowledge of future ill-health, requires individuals to reassess themselves and their position 
within a family unit and to look with fresh eyes upon their family history which will have 
suddenly become very unfamiliar. Specificity of knowledge can deprive us of the ostrich’s ‘hole-in-
the-sand’ which can sometimes serve as a valuable psychological coping mechanism.2        
  
C. The Perceived Utility of Tests (Introducing Other Interested Parties) 
It is precisely because genetic testing is thought to offer a high degree of specificity in 
6determining future ill-health that genetic information is seen to have a “value” not only for a 
proband or his or her relatives, but also for parties outside the familial milieu. Insurers, 
employers, and researchers can find considerable utility in genetic information where test results 
might impact their own interests. It is apposite, however, to offer a word of caution on the 
perceived value of genetic information in this context.
Genetic diseases may have a variety of causes. On the one hand, monogenic diseases are 
caused by mutations in the genome that directly result in disease. These diseases can either be 
recessive or dominant. Recessive conditions such as cystic fibrosis or sickle cell anaemia are 
caused when an individual inherits two copies of a defective gene from his or her parents. If only 
one copy is inherited, then disease is not manifested, but the individual becomes an 
asymptomatic carrier for the condition. In contrast, dominant disorders are inherited when only 
one copy of a disease gene is passed on. Its influence overrides the effects of its twin “healthy” 
copy. In both cases, the predictability of disease in future generations is a relatively straight 
forward exercise. For a recessive disorder where both parents are carriers, there is a 25% risk in 
the case of each pregnancy that a child will be born affected, a 50% risk that a child will be born 
as a carrier and only a 25% chance that the child will inherit two copies of the healthy gene. For 
dominant disorders, the chances of having an affected child are 50% in each case. It is 
understandable that interested parties might place considerable store in test results, in light of 
such figures. However, it is of crucial importance also to consider other forms of genetic disease, 
which, in fact, represent by far the greater category of genetic diseases that affect individuals and 
families. 
Polygenic disorders are caused by the interaction of two or more defective genes, and 
the chances of being affected are consequently more difficult to predict.3 Moreover, these 
disorders are part of the wider class of multifactorial conditions that involve disease processes 
caused not only by genetic defects but also by the interaction of those genes with environmental 
factors, all of which can be operative in the onset of disease. Axiomatically, the predictability of 
7the onset of multifactorial conditions is considerably lower than that for monogenic conditions. 
The value of genetic test results for such conditions is consequently diminished. The obvious 
conclusion is that it is impossible to attach a uniform value to the practice of genetic testing for 
an entire range of conditions.4  
But, even if third parties were to restrict their interests to monogenic disorders, the 
predictability value of testing is none the less affected by other considerations. Testing can only 
offer probabilities of onset of disease. Importantly, it cannot give any indications of when disease 
will arise, nor of the degree to which any one individual will be affected (and this can vary 
considerably as between individuals), nor can tests necessarily detect mutations for particular 
conditions. Accordingly, there can be a significant risk of false negatives.5 All of these factors 
undermine the utility of genetic testing because they demonstrate that what is predictable is only 
predictable in a limited number of cases, which, in themselves, are further subject to a range of 
variables. Each of these factors can have a significant bearing on the outcome. Knowledge and 
certainty must, therefore, be seen as relative concepts.
D. What Is Genetic Information?
It becomes increasingly clear as more work is carried out on the human genome that a 
genetic component might have a factor to play in many disease processes, and not simply in 
those that have been classified to date as genetic. This may impact considerably on the subject 
matter of any legislation which is enacted to protect genetic information. A definition of this 
term that is too narrow might prove to be useless in protecting any interests at all, while an 
overly broad definition might, for example, encompass data used in important research, with the 
resultant risk that such work might be unduly hampered. Indeed, such a definition might include 
details of family history, if, as has been suggested above, a family history is thought to reveal 
familial genetic information.6
8In recognition of these problems of definition the Task Force on Genetic Testing, a 
joint working group of the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health, has 
offered a working definition of genetic test information that seeks to strike a balance between 
protecting legitimate interests in test results while, at the same time, avoiding the conclusion that 
any kind of medical test is, in fact, a genetic test.7 The definition restricts genetic testing to 
“processes which are carried out for the direct analysis of human DNA and other compounds 
such as RNA, chromosomes, proteins and certain metabolites, with a view to achieving a number 
of clearly identified end points; namely, the prediction of inherited disease, the detection of 
carrier status or the diagnosis of actual inherited disease.” This, then, can encompass not only the 
testing of individuals but also the screening of at-risk populations, and will include prenatal and 
antenatal screening and the testing of families with recognised histories of genetic disease. 
By corollary, this also means that the contents of one’s medical file do not necessarily 
contain genetic information and that testing for certain conditions in which a genetic factor is 
operative, such as diabetes or ischaemic heart disease, will not be classified as genetic testing 
unless there is a high probability that the genetic form of the disease is at work. While it is the 
case that all human cellular material contains a complete copy of the genome (with the exception 
of the gametes), tests that do not involve the direct analysis of the DNA, but rather concern 
other traits of the cells, will not be deemed to be genetic tests. The Task Force specifically 
excludes certain testing from their definition, for example, tests conducted purely for research, 
tests for somatic mutations (compare heritable mutations), and tests for forensic purposes. On 
this basis, the genetic information that the Task Force would seek to protect would be restricted 
to information that arises from genetic tests falling within the definition, and would not be so 
broad as to cover abstract data about family history. A definition such as this would be an 
important starting point in developing specific genetic-related legislation. Of course, whether that 
exercise in itself is necessarily a good thing is another matter entirely, and will be discussed 
below.          
9E. Lessons We Cannot (Currently) Learn from Genetic Information
A important rider to this discussion concerns the knowledge that genetic advances do 
not currently give us, except in a few, rare instances. Primarily, this is knowledge about how to 
treat or cure a genetic disorder for which a test has been developed. As the United Kingdom’s 
Science and Technology Committee has pointed out,
This poses the dilemma of how we should respond to this limited knowledge. If the 
pursuit of better health is our goal, then we must ask whether, and how, this current knowledge 
can assist in achieving that goal. In the absence of therapies or cures, preparedness is often cited 
as a reason to seek out genetic knowledge. Certainly, one can better prepare for reproductive 
decisions in the light of proper information about genetic risks, and in the case of multifactorial 
conditions, lifestyle changes might minimize the health implications of carrying a defective gene. 
The achievement of psychological preparedness for the onset of future disease through the 
disclosure of risk is, however, by no means certain. Psychological health may be damaged, rather 
than improved, by such disclosures. This is explored further below. The lesson, however, is that 
we should not expect too much of this knowledge in our quest to improve health. To do so may 
mean that we achieve nothing more than the frustration our own efforts.   
A final crucial lesson to be learned is that we cannot know all of the ends to which 
genetic information might be put. Illegitimate uses of this information, which result in harm, 
discrimination, and stigmatisation, must clearly be guarded against. Yet, the question of where 
the boundary lies between legitimate and illegitimate use, or indeed, between legitimate and 
illegitimate claims with respect to genetic information, is similarly not answered by the new 
“While genetics is likely eventually to transform medicine, it may take some while before 
treatments based on genetic knowledge become available...[i]n the short term, the most 
widespread use of medical genetics will be, as now, in diagnosis and screening”8.
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knowledge that genetic science gives us. We must, therefore, determine for ourselves where these 
limits are to be drawn. This article offers one model by which we may do so.
II. THE INTERESTED PARTIES
It is through an examination of the respective interests which parties have in genetic 
information that we can understand the nature of potential problems. Such an analysis also 
serves to bring the issues within the rubric of a common language, which in turn allows us to 
compare and contrast various, and at times competing, claims with respect to genetic 
information. 
An interest is here defined as a claim that a benefit can come to the party in question by 
recognizing that the party has a relationship with the subject of the interest; in this case, genetic 
information. The question of whether a party has an interest in genetic information is, of course, 
an evaluative matter. Integral to the notion of interest is the idea that it is in the party's interest to 
recognize the relationship with the genetic information. And, to do so, normally will lead to the 
conclusion that it is therefore in the party's interest to know, and to have access to the 
information, in question.9 However, such an assumption should not go unchallenged in all 
circumstances, as is explained below.
A. An Individual's Interest in Personal Genomic Information
It is axiomatic that a person who has been tested for one or more genetic conditions has 
a significant interest in knowing and determining what happens to the resulting information. 
Arguably, genetic information is “the most personal information of all”10. While it can be 
asserted that any form of personal health information is inherently part of the private sphere of 
an individual's life, genetic information has a unique relationship with the individual in many 
specific ways. For example, as Suter has noted,
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“[w]hile contracting chicken pox has virtually no effect on identity, the knowledge that one 
carries a disease gene may influence one's self-perception and definition of "one's own concept 
of existence" in a way most infectious diseases do not”11.
Furthermore, and again unlike conventional health information, genetic information 
cannot be completely anonymised. It is a unique marker pointing the way to a single individual. 
As Gostin puts it:
Moreover, genetic information does not simply provide information about an 
individual's medical past, which is the case with most medical records. Genetic information also 
can furnish knowledge about an individual's medical future. This knowledge can be vague, in that 
we know only that the person has a certain percentage risk of developing disease, or it can be 
certain; we know that given time, disease will develop. Either way, such knowledge permits those 
who hold it to make judgments about the future life of the individual. Not all such persons will 
be the individual.
For these reasons, an individual has a very strong claim to control the circumstances in 
which this information is generated and to determine what happens to the information 
subsequently. In essence, persons have an interest in this information because it relates to them 
and can affect their lives in profound ways. As moral agents, their decisions regarding this 
information are entitled to respect. 
Genomic data are qualitatively different from other health data 
because they are inherently linked to one person. While non-
genetic descriptions of any given patient's disease and 
treatment could apply to many other individuals, genomic data 
are unique. But, although the ability to identify a named 
individual in a large population simply from genetic material is 
unlikely, the capacity of computers to search multiple data 
bases provides a potential for linking genomic information to 
that person. It follows that non-linked genomic data do not 
assure anonymity and that privacy and security safeguards must 
attach to any form of genetic material12. 
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B. The Interest of Relatives in a Proband's Genetic Information
In an entirely unique way, exactly the same reasons specified above can be advanced by 
the blood relatives of a proband to claim an interest in genetic test results because a test result 
also will reveal information about them.13 On this basis the “right to know” is frequently 
founded.14 Yet, in one important respect, relatives stand in a very different position to a person 
who has sought out testing, for the latter has made a conscious decision to acquire the 
information in question, while this might not be true for relatives. We must, therefore, be alive to 
the possibility that family members might be surprised, or even loath, to learn of a relative's 
predisposition to a particular genetic condition, given the likelihood that they carry a similar risk. 
And yet, once such information exists questions of security, access, and control arise. 
Furthermore, if the individuals to whom the information relates do not agree on such issues, 
problems of weighing the competing interests in the balance must be addressed.15
The question of whether the interest of relatives is as strong as that of the proband is 
more difficult to answer. Certainly, the risk of more distant relatives being affected by a particular 
condition is reduced because of the different genetic influences to which they have been 
subjected compared with the proband.16 Those relatives with the strongest interest of all are the 
first degree relatives of the person who has been tested. The interests of such relatives include 
those of the children of a proband who might want to know whether they have any risk of 
disease that might affect themselves or their progeny. Siblings, too, have a strong interest in each 
other's test results given their common parentage. A further complicating factor is the potential 
claims of non blood-related relatives such as spouses, whose reproductive decisions can be 
profoundly affected if they are denied access to genetic information that might indicate the 
presence of disease within their partner’s family. 
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Finally, it is important to stress that, even if test results show no risk of disease, it should 
not be presumed that individuals will be happy to surrender control of genetic information. 
Relatives retain an interest in each other's genetic information even if it reveals nothing sinister. 
The information is intimately connected with their private sphere and their sense of self and 
therefore to disrespect the information is to disrespect the persons concerned. Moreover, it 
should not be thought that accuracy of information is in any way a prerequisite to discrimination 
or stigmatization at the hands of third parties.17
From the above it is clear that conflict will arise when the proband wishes to keep test 
results secure and family members wish to know them. That is, when the individual wishes to 
keep the data private and the family wish to invade that private sphere, or perhaps, become part 
of that private sphere. The converse is, of course, also true. For, conflict can arise when the 
proband is willing to permit access to genetic information, for example, to third parties outside 
the family, yet relatives are unwilling to relinquish control of these familial data. Here family 
privacy might be in jeopardy. Moreover, relatives might be unwilling to receive such data into 
their own private sphere when they have previously been in ignorance, given the implications this 
knowledge might have for their future lives. Here the privacy of the relatives might be invaded 
by unsolicited disclosures of information to them.
1. The Individual and the Family:  An Interest in not Knowing?
The question arises of whether individuals - either a proband or his or her relatives -
have an interest in not knowing test results. For example, a proband might agree to be tested but 
then change his or her mind. Equally, relatives might be approached by a proband willing to 
reveal test results but they might refuse to accept the information. On what basis might 
individuals have an interest in not knowing information? 
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It is frequently argued that knowledge of genetic information can bring many benefits to 
individuals. If a cure or therapy is available, then it can be sought and ill health may be averted. 
Yet, even if a cure or therapy is not available, knowledge can nevertheless serve several ends. For 
example, because multifactorial conditions are by definition affected by many influences 
including the non genetic, knowledge of a predisposition to such a condition can provide 
individuals with the opportunity to change aspects of their lifestyle. This can in turn influence the 
onset of disease.18 Moreover, it has been argued that, with knowledge, comes preparedness for 
the risk of developing a disease at a later stage in life.19 Similarly, the discovery of disease or 
predisposition to disease means that any reproductive decision that is taken thereafter will be an 
informed one. Unfortunately, such arguments all suffer from one fundamental weakness: they 
presume that only benefit can result from knowledge. This is not necessarily so.
The availability of a cure or a therapy carries with it the certainty that disclosure can 
avert harm uncontrovertibly, or at least minimize it considerably.20 For a person to whom such a 
disclosure is made this can only be seen as a good thing. If, however, disclosure is made to avoid 
an ancillary harm, such as psychological upset, then there is less of a guarantee that the harm in 
question will, de facto, be avoided. Evidence exists from empirical studies that both supports21 and 
refutes22 the benefits of disclosure to facilitate preparedness. Thus, it is entirely possible that 
individuals might be loath to learn of a relative's genetic status because of the implications this 
knowledge can have for their own well-being. Indeed, the Danish Council of Ethics has warned 
of the risk of “morbidification”: the notion of falling victim to some inescapable fate through 
knowledge about risk of disease.23
The possible adverse effects of knowledge of genetic predisposition have been well 
documented by Hoffman and Wulfsberg.24 They cite three examples of child screening 
programmes in Sweden, the United States and Wales involving respectively, Alpha1 -antitrypsin 
deficiency,25 Cystic Fibrosis,26 and Duchenne's muscular dystrophy.27
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In 1972, the Swedish government initiated a nationwide screening program of newborns. 
As part of the program parents were (1) told whether the child had alpha1 -antitrypsin deficiency, 
(2) counselled to protect the child from environmental factors such as smoking or high dense-
particle atmospheres, which could exacerbate the child's problems, and (3) followed to determine 
the psychological impact of the information. Follow-up studies showed that more than half of 
the families with affected children suffered adverse psychological consequences, some of which 
continued for five to seven years. Moreover, there was little evidence of reduction in smoking 
among parents of affected children. Indeed, in some cases, an increase was noted. This led 
directly to the abandonment of the program by the Swedish government in 1974.28
In like manner, Hoffman and Wulfsberg note that Cystic Fibrosis screening programmes 
in the United States, which commenced as early as 1968, were abandoned because “many people 
think (even in cases where there is a familial risk for the disease) that early detection has no value 
and may, in fact, cause the family significant psychological distress prior to the time when the 
individual might become symptomatic”29. For these reasons the authors assert that the United 
States has not instituted a programme of screening newborns for Duchenne's muscular 
dystrophy, unlike Wales in the United Kingdom, where such a programme has run since 1990.30
Similar evidence is available for adults. Kevles has noted, citing several studies, that, 
“[t]he revelation of genetic hazard has been observed to result not only in repression but in 
anxiety, depression, and a sense of stigmatisation”.31 Most recently, Almqvist et al. have found in 
an international study that the suicide rate among persons given a positive genetic test result for 
Huntington disease was 10 times higher than the United States average.32 While this rate is no 
greater than that for the symptomatic Huntington disease population (nor indeed, is it vastly 
greater than the rate for persons with other debilitating and progressive diseases), it is significant 
that the survey primarily focused on the two years after test results were given. This would tend 
to indicate that the deaths were more directly related to the disclosure of the genetic information, 
rather than to some other factors, such as the onset of disease itself.33
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Finally, it has even been observed that confirmation of one's status as a non affected
person also can have adverse psychological effects. Huggins et al34 and Wexler35 have carried out 
studies in families affected by genetic disease that show “[m]any may suffer ‘survivor guilt’, 
particularly characteristic of wartime soldiers who live while their buddies are killed”.36
The possibility that any or all of these forms of harm can result means that individuals 
can cite a strong interest in not knowing genetic information about themselves.37 However, one 
should not imagine that potential harm is the only reason for claiming an interest in not knowing. 
The question of respect also arises. To disclose genetic information to someone who has not 
expressed a desire to know may be disrespectful in two ways. First, if the individual has 
specifically stated they do not wish to know the information, then it is an affront to them as 
moral chooser to furnish the information nevertheless. Second, even if no such wish has been 
expressed, then it can be offensive to provide information in the absence of a justified reason for 
doing so. While no tangible harm might result from disclosure, the fact that the individual's 
private sphere is invaded with such information can be problematic. For example, it was stated in 
the preamble to the World Medical Association Declaration on the Human Genome Project that 
“[t]his area of scientific progress will profoundly affect the lives of present and future members 
of society, bringing into question the very identity of the human individual and intruding upon 
the snail's pace of evolution in a decisive and probably irreversible manner”.38
The implications these advances have for personal privacy are extremely far-reaching. To 
discover that one is likely to develop a debilitating condition in later life or that one might pass 
on such a condition to one's children can be a devastating and profound experience. Exposure to 
such knowledge can challenge notions of self-identity and alter considerably one's self-
perception.39 It requires individuals to take on board information which then cannot be 
unknown. The knowledge becomes a factor that will necessarily become part of many future life 
decisions of the individual. Individuals are coerced into self-reflection and forced to evaluate and 
reevaluate themseleves. While it might be argued that it is in the individual's best interests to 
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know the information, this is to make an evaluative judgement which, to be justified, must surely 
weigh in the balance the possibility that disclosure might be unwanted or harmful in certain 
circumstances. To presume that individuals will always and necessarily wish to know familial 
genetic information is not only to ignore these possible adverse consequences, but it is also to 
disrespect such persons, for such a presumption disregards the individuality of subjects and 
subjugates them to a view of life which is not their own.      
For all of these reasons it is submitted that both the proband and his or her relatives 
could have an interest in not knowing genetic information. However, the recognition of this 
interest complicates matters considerably. The various claims require close scrutiny, especially 
given that the resolution of the matter also will have implications for family members further 
down the genetic line. In order to conduct this scrutiny adequately, it is necessary to consider the 
key principles, values, and factors that are of relevance in resolving conflict dynamics in the 
medical-legal sphere. 
III. WESTERN PRINCIPLES AND VALUES: A BRIEF ANTHOLOGY
A. Principles of Ethics 
The so-called “four principles of ethics” have significantly influenced much of western thinking 
and action, particularly in the medical-legal sphere. These four principles are autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice.40 Autonomy refers to a state of moral independence, 
and an autonomous individual is one who is a “moral chooser”.41 The principle of respect for 
patient autonomy is fundamental to good medical practice and is the cornerstone of many ethical 
and legal requirements concerning the way in which health care professionals treat their patients. 
Among other things, the principle requires that patients be consulted about health care 
provision, that their consent be sought to proceed with medical interventions, and that their 
wishes concerning treatment be respected, even when such wishes run counter to the advice or 
18
wishes of health care professionals. This extends to respect for the patients' wishes about their 
personal health information. Beneficence and nonmaleficence prescribe, respectively, that one 
should strive where possible to bring benefit to individuals and that, cotemporaneously, one 
should endeavour at all times to minimize harm to them and others. Justice requires that 
comparable cases be treated alike and that no unjustifiable decisions are made that prejudice one 
individual or group over another on irrelevant or unjustified grounds. 
B. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is characterized by a relationship involving two or more individuals one 
or more of whom has undertaken, explicitly or implicitly, not to reveal to third parties 
information concerning the other individual in the relationship. It is widely accepted that health 
care professionals owe a duty of confidence to their patients and that only rarely should 
disclosure without patient consent be made. While exceptions to the duty exist, in practice no 
breach is made lightly or without good cause. Confidentiality is the duty of the health care 
professional and the right of the patient.  
C. Privacy
The definition of privacy offered in this article and the justification for its value will be 
argued presently. More generally, privacy is an interest that is premised on setting the “private” -
which is bound up inherently with the personal - in contradistinction to the “public”. The 
maintenance of a public/private divide, and the location of certain personal attributes within the 
latter and therefore out of the reach of the former, is commonly taken as a “good”.  It should be 
clear that certain interests may be common to privacy, confidentiality, and autonomy, and may be 
protected to varying degrees by each. This is especially true in the context of personal 
information.   
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D. Public Interest   
Public interest is an amorphous concept that has a role to play in both ethics and law. It 
acts as a safeguard equally for individual and collective interests, but suffers from a lack of 
precise definition. It is open to abuse as a result. Nevertheless, the concept reflects many 
important values and must be considered in this debate. When public interest enters the equation 
it is usually weighed in the balance with another public interest. For example, the public interest 
in disclosure compared to the public interest in maintaining confidences generally. In the context 
of public interest, community interests and values are at stake, and, as such, necessarily and 
frequently subsume private interests within their scope.    
E. Additional Factors
In addition to the above, there are several factors that must be considered when trying to 
resolve complex issues surrounding genetic information. These are not only highly relevant but 
context specific and can be invoked - alone or in combination - in particular situations to assist in 
making the strongest argument for the most appropriate outcome. These factors are listed below.
1. The Availability of a Therapy or Cure
If death or disease can be avoided incontrovertibly, or if the effects of disease can be 
substantially diminished, then it is trite that very strong arguments must be advanced to prevent 
disclosure of genetic information to those likely to be affected, especially in the absence of some 
other means of preventing harm. If, however, nothing can be done to prevent the onset of 
genetic disease or to alleviate suffering, then the argument for disclosure is accordingly 
weakened. 
2. The Severity of the Condition and Likelihood of Onset
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A fatal condition intuitively calls for action if death can be prevented. In contrast, a mild 
condition for which nothing can be done makes arguing for disclosure more difficult. In like 
manner, a 50% risk of developing a genetic condition, which lies with a first degree relative, is 
more compelling than a 1% or 2% risk to unidentified third cousins. 
3. The Nature of Genetic Disease
The affliction of one individual with genetic disease does not pose any direct threat to any 
other living human being. In this respect, genetic disease is very different to many other diseases. 
Also, with recessive disorders that render people asymptomatic carriers, there is additionally no 
threat to the health of the carrier. Only future progeny might be affected. Facts such as this can 
have a bearing on how one views particular complex scenarios.42
4. The Nature of Genetic Testing
The point already has been made that predictive genetic testing (and family history) are 
imprecise tools for assessing future risk. Thus, it is important to appreciate that any trade in 
information is trade in further uncertainty. People may be alerted to a possibility, but they cannot 
be apprised of a medical certainty in respect of their own health without undertaking further 
steps, such as additional testing. If there is good reason to suspect that such further steps will not 
be taken, then there is good reason to reflect seriously on any decision to disclose information at 
all.  
5. The Nature of the Request
If individuals are asked to disclose or receive genetic information, then the specific nature of 
the request might have an influence on the outcome one would recommend. For example, if an 
individual is asked simply to take part in linkage tests to determine a relative's particular risk (for 
procreative purposes) and the tested individual receives guarantees that she or he will not be 
given the test results, then such an altruistic gesture is unlikely to conflict in any way with that 
individual's interests. Compare this with an unexpected advance from a health care professional 
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or relative to disclose a 50% chance of developing a late onset condition in the future. In the 
former example, the individual is not being asked to take on board any information about 
himself or herself, while in the latter they are placed in a position where they have no other 
option but to do so. 
6. The Views and Likely Reaction of the Disclosee
Evidence of how individuals might react to information about their genetic make-up can 
be of considerable assistance in determining whether a disclosure should be made. Clearly, of 
most value is evidence that the individual has specifically requested to know or not to know the 
information in question. This is an expression of autonomy and as such should be respected 
where possible.
IV. SCENARIO
The following scenario is offered to demonstrate the problems that can arise when the 
factors, principles, and values discussed above are brought to bear on practical situations. The 
scenario will be considered from the perspective of the three central stalwarths of medical law 
and ethics; namely, autonomy, confidentiality, and privacy. It will be argued that the first two of 
these fail to protect adequately the interests at stake, and an argument will be put in defense of a 
particular conception of privacy as a means to recognize and protect the interests in question.  
A. Recognizing a Right Not to Know?
BRCA1 is the gene responsible for between five and ten percent of female breast 
cancers. It was discovered in 1994 and is known to be ten times longer than most human genes.43
This fact means that the likelihood of mutations is increased and this in turn has implications for 
the efficacy of test kits designed to identify the gene, for they cannot detect all mutations. There 
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is a high risk of secondary cancers associated with this disease, but early detection and radical 
intervention in the form of mastectomy can reduce this risk. Preventative measures, also in the 
form of mastectomies, can reduce the instances of disease.44 The condition is also thought to be 
multifactorial, further complicating matters.
Nicola is aware of a history of breast cancer in her family. Her mother, her great-grandmother, 
and one of her aunts died from the disease. Nicola has a sister, Nadia, and three female 
cousins, Norma, Romana, and Elvira. She does not know the extent to which these relatives 
are aware of the pattern of disease in the family. Recently, Nicola discovered a lump in her 
breast which has been diagnosed as malignant. She is concerned that the BRCA1 gene runs in 
her family and that her sister and cousins are at risk. Nicola's physician has advised a 
mastectomy and has strongly urged her to contact her relatives to arrange testing. Should she 
approach her sister and cousins with the news of her own disease and urge them to seek medical 
advice? She is aware, for example, that Nadia is phobic about operations and that Elvira is 
prone to bouts of depression.
V. Shifting Paradigms: The Efficacy of Autonomy, Confidentiality, and Privacy in 
Meeting Challenges posed by Genetic Advances
In this section, we explore the nature and content of the ethical and legal principles of 
autonomy and confidentiality to discern what assistance, if any, they offer in the resolution of 
this dilemma. In the next section, the conclusions of this section are contrasted with the solution 
proposed by the author’s concept of privacy. 
A. The Merits of Existing Paradigms: Autonomy
The term autonomy is derived from the Greek words autos (“self”) and nomos (“law” or “rule”). 
While there is no unifying definition of the principle of autonomy from the philosophical or 
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ethical perspective,45 certain core elements can be identified that provide a workable model of 
autonomy for use in the health care setting.
First, the idea of choice is central to the principle of respect for autonomy.46  To be 
respected as an autonomous person is to have one's choices respected. Second, crucial to this 
respect is noninterference. In order to make one's own choices - that is, for those choices to be 
autonomous - one must be unrestrained by unwarranted interference by others.47 Finally, bound 
up with all of this is possession of the capacity to make one's own choices.48 Although autonomy 
is concerned with choice and the exercise of that choice in relation to life decisions, realistically it 
must be accepted that no person can control, at all times, all aspects of his or her life.49 It is only 
necessary that a certain degree of autonomy is reached and that capacity to make a choice is 
present in relation to the choice which must be taken. The standard that is required in practical 
terms is always a question to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of each 
case.50 Rather, what is important is that autonomy and autonomous choices be respected. This is 
embodied in law in most western jurisdictions in ways that do not require repetition here.51
It should not be thought, however, that the principle of respect for autonomy and the 
other ethical principles discussed above always function harmoniously. Indeed, it is easy to 
imagine situations where an individual might wish to exercise his or her autonomy in a manner 
that might interfere with the autonomy of others and/or cause them harm and/or treat them 
unfairly. As Beauchamp and Childress point out,
“Respect for autonomy . . . has only prima facie standing and 
can be overridden by competing moral considerations. Typical 
examples are the following: If our choices endanger the public 
health, potentially harm innocent others, or require a scarce 
resource for which no funds are available, others can justifiably 
restrict our exercises of autonomy. The justification must, 
however, rest on some competing and overriding moral 
principles”.52
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Thus, just as the principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice can serve to 
accord respect to individuals and their autonomy, the same principles can be used to impose 
restrictions on individual action and autonomy if this conflicts with other third party interests. 
Ethical principles provide us with a framework of moral reference within which to analyze 
human behaviour and human interaction. Only in a very crude way, however, do they provide us 
with the means of resolving conflict. 
1. Autonomy and Genetic Information
The relevance to genetic information of what has been said above should be obvious. It 
has already been argued that aspects of the self such as the body and personal information 
require respect under the principle of autonomy. The principle also dictates that individuals 
deserve respect concerning the choices they make about what happens to their bodies and their 
personal information. Thus, the principle prescribes that choices concerning genetic information 
are equally deserving of respect. Several problems, however, become immediately apparent. First, 
given that genetic information concerns many individuals in a family, how can the principle of 
autonomy help us to resolve conflicts that arise about the control and use of the information? 
For example, if Patient A is tested and found to be a carrier of cystic fibrosis but wishes to keep 
this to himself, does his pregnant sister nonetheless have a right to the information so that she 
can make an appropriate and autonomous choice about her pregnancy?  In other words, what is 
to be done when two autonomies conflict?
Second, it was noted earlier that there exist certain fundamental criteria that are 
necessary to be an autonomous individual. Central to the principle of autonomy is choice. In 
particular, choices must be taken free from interference and by someone who has the capacity to 
make those choices. Fundamental to such choices is knowledge. One cannot choose in a 
meaningful sense if one is not informed of the parameters within which one must choose. This is 
why informed consent is crucial to ethically and legally acceptable health care. However, in the 
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context of genetics this may be problematic. For, in many circumstances, the problems 
surrounding genetic information are precisely concerned with the absence of knowledge: this is 
the basis of the claim to respect the interest in not knowing genetic information. The choice, if 
there is one, is whether to receive or not to receive information about oneself. This is 
problematic for the concept of autonomy because it is difficult to see how one can exercise 
meaningfully a choice not to know unless one has a certain degree of knowledge that there is 
something to know. Of course, an obvious practical solution would be to approach the individual 
and ask, “do you want to know this information?”, but as Wertz and Fletcher have pointed out, 
“[t]here is no way. . . to exercise the choice of not knowing, because in the very process of 
asking, 'Do you want to know whether you are at risk. . .?' the geneticist has already made the 
essence of the information known”.53
This is not to say that one cannot simply state “I wish to know no information about my 
genetic make-up whatsoever”, nor is it to suggest that such a wish should not be respected. 
However, the requirement that autonomous choices be informed choices tends to imply that the 
credibility of an uninformed choice is more easily questioned. It leaves it open to be argued that 
actual knowledge about circumstances might nevertheless affect the chooser who might choose 
differently if furnished with relevant information. Alternatively, the situation might be seen as 
analogous to the problem of the incapax. Individuala who are incapax cannot choose for 
themselves and so must have choices made for them. In the same way, individuals who are 
ignorant of genetic information might be seen as a pseudo-incapax and therefore it might be 
assumed that it is legitimate to make choices about the genetic information on their behalf, 
including the choice whether to know. Choices for the incapax are often made in the person’s 
best interests. It is far from clear, however, how one would determine an individual's best 
interests concerning genetic information, given that the passing on of knowledge itself can be 
harmful.54
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Applying an autonomy perspective to our scenario reveals how these limitations prove 
problematic in the context of deciding what is the best thing to do with genetic information. 
Nicola must determine whether to approach her relatives with a possible index of genetic risk in 
the absence of any views about her relatives wishes. What guidance might be offered by the 
principle of autonomy?
At first blush, one might assume that because no views have been expressed by the 
relatives the principle of autonomy is unhelpful. In like manner, the principles of nonmaleficence 
and beneficence also would appear unhelpful because of the nature of the condition and the 
circumstances of the family. These principles require that harm should be avoided and benefit 
conferred wherever possible. It is not clear, however, whether this could be achieved by the 
subject of our scenario by disclosing information about her condition and the risk to relatives. As 
has been argued above, harm can result from the mere fact of disclosure and the personal 
circumstances of two of the relatives would tend to indicate that psychological trauma is 
probable. Also, it is important to consider the nature of the treatment that is offered. 
Mastectomy is a very traumatic and potentially psychologically devastating operation. The 
sequelae can include altered perception of self-image and feelings of loss of identity. The 
preference for some women might be not to have the operation. This is likely to be true of 
Nadia who is phobic about surgery.  Furthermore, even if testing proves to be negative, exposure 
to the knowledge of increased risk can heighten concerns about future ill health. Testing and 
counselling might not allay such fears, especially in someone such as Elvira who is depressive. 
These factors mean that Nicola should consider very seriously whether or not to disclose the 
information. 
Yet, the perceived utility of autonomy-based arguments extends beyond circumstances 
in which a meaningful choice is within the grasp of an individual. For, even in cases where no 
choice has been made or where no meaningful choice is possible for want of information, 
autonomy is frequently advanced as a reason to put individuals in a position whereby they can
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choose. Indeed, the facilitation of autonomous choices is a generally given good in contemporary 
health care.55 However, it is important to distinguish between cases in which the physician-
patient alliance has been established at the behest of the patient, and those in which an individual 
is approached by a physician, or some other third party, with information that is perceived to be 
of benefit to the individual’s future health. In the former case, an alliance has been established 
wherein the goals of the union have been agreed by the parties, and when the promotion of the 
patient’s health (and autonomy) is one of those goals. In the latter case, there is no mutually 
agreed alliance, and unilateral efforts to “optimize [someone else’s] future health”56 are 
ontologically and ethically different. Indeed, Malm has gone so far as to argue in the context of 
screening that, while a recommended treatment for a patient should be justified on the 
“preponderance of the evidence” as embodying a benefit, in the case of preventive medicine “the 
evidence must show it to be beyond reasonable doubt that the recommended procedure will 
benefit the patient on balance.”57       
This is not, however, a well accepted view. The preferred view is that autonomy should 
not only be respected, but sought out where possible. Thus, in our scenario, Nicola might be 
drawn on an autonomy analysis to disclose her family information to her relatives, in spite of the 
risks, in order to allow her relatives to choose for themselves what they wish to do. 
For all of these reasons, it is submitted that the principle of autonomy is particularly 
unhelpful in addressing the question of an interest not to know. Nicola cannot simply approach 
her relatives to ask if they would like to know, because this in itself immediately compromises 
the interest in not knowing. If she treats them as incapax, she then must consider what is in their 
best interests, but this is not easily discernible on the facts. Nor, indeed, does it have anything to 
do with the autonomy of her relatives, but rather their perceived incapacity. Finally, if she seeks 
to facilitate their autonomy, then disclosure is likely, because the bias is to allow persons to 
decide for themselves by knowing the options which are available. This, however, ignores the 
fact that the interest at stake in one about whether to receive knowledge at all.  
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All of this would tend to indicate that the basis for a claim not to know information 
cannot be the principle of autonomy alone. 
B. The Merits of Existing Paradigms: Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is concerned with security of information. To be precise, it is concerned 
with the security of confidential information. To be confidential, information must be in a state 
of limited access from individuals, groups, bodies, and institutions generally.58 The nature of the 
confidential relationship has been described above. Most particularly, it is accepted almost 
unquestionably that health care professionals owe a duty of confidence to their patients and that 
only exceptionally should disclosure without consent be made.59
It is trite, therefore, to confirm that the woman who has been diagnosed with breast 
cancer in our scenario is owed a duty of confidence by her health care professional. This entitles 
her to decide whether and how the information, which is the object of the duty, should be 
disclosed to others. However, in the case of her relatives, it would be possible for the health care 
professional to justify disclosing the information to them even without the patient’s consent, 
because the duty of confidentiality is not absolute, and certain exceptions are admitted, including 
actions to prevent harm to third parties.60 Indeed, a considerable and far-reaching discretion to 
disclose on such grounds is afforded to health care professionals. Yet, this is not our problem in 
the scenario. Nicola is willing to tell her relatives about her condition; our problem is that it is 
not clear that she should do so. What is clear, however, is that she cannot herself breach a duty 
that is owed to her by another. If she decides to disclose her condition to her family there could 
be no question of a breach of the duty of confidence. Thus, for her disclosure to amount to a 
breach of confidence, it must be seen to be an invasion of someone else's right and a breach of 
her duty to maintain confidentiality. Can the family dynamic envisaged by our scenario fit into 
such a rubric?
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The first matter to determine is the circumstances in which a duty of confidence arises 
as between two parties. Legally,61 professionally,62 and ethically,63 health care professionals owe 
duties of confidentiality to their patients. While the sources of this duty in law are many and 
varied64, in each case the duty arises with respect to the specific relationship that the professional 
has with patients, qua patients, and it is not thought to be the case that legal duties arise merely 
by virtue of the fact that an individual comes into possession of personal information about 
another.65 Thus, absent some specific customary or professional, contractual or impliedly 
contractual relationship,66 a duty to maintain confidences is unlikely to arise.67 This would suggest 
that, in our scenario, no duty of confidentiality is owed to the relatives of Nicola, either by the 
health care professional, or indeed Nicola herself.68 Each is therefore free to disclose the 
information, subject solely to Nicola’s wishes.
Moreover, even if a duty of confidentiality were owed, protection of the interest in not 
knowing information cannot flow from this legal construct. It would be unreasonable to suggest 
that the duty can be breached by one relative telling the person to whom the duty is owed the 
information in question. A duty of confidence is breached when confidential information is used 
or disclosed to those outside the confidential relationship. A breach of duty is constituted by 
making the information in some way public. Precisely how public any use or disclosure must be 
is a matter of debate, but it cannot be the case that disclosure of information from one party to a 
confidential relationship to the other party in anyway makes the information public. This then 
means that even if a duty of confidence is owed in our scenario by Nicola to her female relatives, 
she could not breach that duty by disclosing the information to the women themselves. Thus 
confidentiality provides no means to protect the interest that these women have in not knowing 
information about themselves.
Indeed, one might suggest it is the confidential relationship that receives protection and 
not the information conveyed between the parties. If this were not true, then why would it 
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matter who was in possession of the information or how they came by it? If the information 
were protected, then it would be protected irrespective of the circumstances in which it was 
imparted or received. The confidential quality of the information would be enough to merit 
protection. In the authorities cited above, however, it is clear that the decisions have little to do 
with the nature of the information and everything to do with the recognition of a relationship as 
privileged. The right of confidentiality is, therefore, a right in personam and not in rem.
The consequence of this is that the concept of confidentiality does not accord a right to 
relatives of a proband to control the flow of familial genetic information toward themselves. If 
they are to be informed of familial information, then this either will be as an exercise of the right 
of the proband to control his or her own information, or as a result of a discretion exercised by a 
health care professional to breach confidentiality without fear of sanction.69 More importantly for 
present purposes, it is not clear that, even if a duty of confidence is owed between relatives 
concerning their common genetic information, such a duty could ever be breached simply by 
telling relatives themselves about their own personal information. It therefore becomes apparent 
that the law of confidence cannot address the question of protecting a possible interest in not 
knowing information, such as might arise in the scenario described above. 
C. The Protection of Privacy Interests by Autonomy and Confidentiality 
This section draws the first part of this article to a conclusion. We have examined the 
nature of the interests that individuals have in genetic information and these can be described as 
being of two sorts. First, there are interests that concern issues of security of existing 
information, and second, there are interests that relate to the protection of the self from 
unwarranted intrusion, including intrusion with information about one's own being. We have 
seen in the last two sections how the existing concepts of autonomy and confidentiality fare in 
protecting the latter type of interest and we can conclude that the major problem arises in the 
context of interest in not knowing. While both confidentiality and autonomy can, to an extent, 
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help to protect interests concerning access and control of known genetic information, these 
concepts, alone or in combination, cannot furnish a useful, precise, and effective means of 
articulating all of the interests involved, or of protecting them in an appropriate fashion. The 
solution that is proposed in the next section is that of a concept of genetic privacy, for it is 
submitted that the interests which are at stake are, in essence, privacy interests. Presently, 
therefore, a definition of privacy is argued for and defended within the context of the wider 
debate about the value of privacy per se and its current protection both at common law and under 
the United States Constitution. This novel definition is then applied to the genetic information 
scenario to show how the privacy interests involved can best be protected by an appeal to 
privacy itself.
VI. PRIVACY 
A. Privacy: A Definition
A valuable concept of privacy should reflect the privacy needs of persons in society. In 
western society these needs are reflected in two views of privacy. First, privacy can be seen as as 
a state of non access to the individual's physical body or psychological person; what I will call 
spatial privacy. Second, privacy can be viewed as a state in which the individual has control over 
personal information; what I will term informational privacy. From these two conceptions of 
privacy, one can deduce a single unifying definition: privacy as a state of separateness from 
others. Thus, privacy should be taken to refer to a state in which an individual is separate from 
others, either in a bodily or psychological sense, or by reference to the inaccessibility of certain 
intimate adjuncts to their individuality and personality, such as personal information. The 
reasons for this choice of definition will be more fully considered and properly justified in the 
next section. 
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B. Why Protect Privacy?
A number of arguments can be offered to justify privacy protection. First, it has been 
posited by several commentators that a state of physical separateness from others is necessary in 
order to allow personal relationships to begin and to grow. The levels of intimacy that typify the 
modern personal relationship only can be achieved by ensuring and securing separateness from 
others. Trust, which is essential to the establishment and maintenance of all relationships, 
requires not only a degree of intimacy to develop but also a currency in which to deal. An 
important part of that currency is personal information. Individuals trade private information 
both as a sign of trust and on the basis of trust. The security of the information is guaranteed by 
the tacit undertaking that it will not be noised abroad. In this way, personal and professional 
relationships flourish and an important part of the fabric of society is woven more tightly. As 
Fried has said:
“Love and Friendship...involve the initial respect for the rights 
of others which morality requires of everyone. They further 
involve the voluntary and spontaneous relinquishment of 
something between friend and friend, lover and lover. The title 
to information about oneself conferred by privacy provides the 
necessary something. To be friends or lovers persons must be 
intimate to some degree with each other. Intimacy is the 
sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions 
which one does not share with all, and which one has the right 
not to share with anyone”.70
Second, a degree of separateness - that is, being alone with no company or merely 
selected company - allows the individual personality to reflect on experiences and learn from 
them. Constant company, and so constant interaction, deprives the individual of time to 
assimilate life experiences and to identify with one's own individuality.71
Third, it has been argued that the modern psychological make-up of individuals is such 
that a degree of separateness is required to ensure that individuals retain a degree of mental 
stability. Jouard has put a forceful argument that (western) public life puts considerable strain on 
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individuals who must assume certain personae to integrate with others. These personae, not 
being full and true reflections of the personality of the individual, cannot be maintained 
indefinitely without serious psychological consequences. A state of privacy allows the masks to 
be dropped and a degree of release to be obtained.72
Fourth, tangible harm can come to an individual who is not granted a degree of privacy. 
As regards spatial privacy, invasion on the body, which is unauthorized, is disrespectful of the 
individual and might, of course, cause physical harm. The criminal and civil laws of assault 
recognize and protect to a degree the inviolability of the human body. Perhaps less obvious but 
no less valid, however, is the mental harm that can arise if one's spatial privacy is not respected. 
For example, clandestine observation can produce profound feelings of violation in individuals 
even although no actual physical contact occurs and/or no personal information is gathered.73
Similarly, unauthorized use or disclosure of personal information can lead to harm to individuals. 
Information about one's personal condition, behavior or habits, which others find distasteful, 
can lead to individuals being ostracised from communities or becoming the object of violence 
and discrimination. As Greenawalt puts it:
“One reason why information control seems so important is 
precisely because society is as intolerant as it is, precisely 
because there are so many kinds of activity that are subject to 
overt government regulation or to the informal sanctions of 
loss of job or reputation”.74
There is, moreover, one final argument in support of the protection of privacy. While 
the above arguments concentrate on individual interests, it is important to recognize that there 
are also public interests in privacy protection. For example, it can be argued that it is in the 
public (societal) interest to have a community inhabited by complete individuals as opposed to 
two-dimensional characters.75 For a society that holds the individual in esteem and seeks to 
accord him or her respect, it is surely in the public interest to reduce to a minimum all potential 
harm to individuals. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that harm can come to society itself 
if privacy is not respected. If the element of trust which is so crucial to the development of 
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relationships is lost, because individuals cannot seek and receive guarantees about the security of 
information, important and valuable information will not be communicated. This can render 
important social organs powerless to deal with a variety of social conditions. This is especially 
true in the health care context, where physician-patient trust is seen to be essential to an effective 
and beneficial therapeutic relationship.76 If that trust is compromised because individual privacy 
is not protected, then public and private health may suffer as a result.
These arguments support the effort to protect privacy as a construct of general social 
good. The specific definition of privacy advanced in this work is, however, two-pronged: it 
relates both to spatial and informational privacy. There are strong reasons for recognizing and 
protecting both kinds of individual privacy - reasons that also are grounded in both private and 
public interests. These are best discussed in the context of the health care setting for which the 
definition of privacy that is offered is intended.     
C. Spatial and Informational Privacy: A Medical-Legal Definition of Privacy
Privacy was defined above broadly as a state of separateness from others. Such a state
encompasses two forms of separateness. Physical or psychological separateness from others 
(spatial privacy) and separateness of certain intimate adjuncts to one’s personality; namely 
personal information (informational privacy). The argument for viewing privacy in such terms is 
as follows. 
First, let us consider informational privacy. Undoubtedly, patients have considerable 
interests in their own medical information because, inter alia, it can be used against them by 
others and this can lead to harmful outcomes such as upset, discrimination, prejudice, etc. 
Informational privacy therefore concerns the interest of the patient in maintaining such 
information in a state of non access and preventing unauthorized use or disclosure of the 
information to third parties. For the purposes of this article, the information in question is 
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genetic information. Thus, a concern about informational privacy is a concern about maintaining 
a state of non access to personal genetic information. For reasons already articulated, an interest 
in genetic informational privacy can be claimed both by a proband and his or her blood relatives.
Second, let us examine spatial privacy. It is submitted that, as a caveat to the above, a 
concept of privacy that is defined solely in informational terms does not adequately reflect the 
interests patients have in privacy matters and so cannot purport to protect comprehensively such 
interests. The concept of spatial privacy is therefore offered as a complement to the concept of 
informational privacy. The concern of spatial privacy is not simply information. Rather, spatial 
privacy relates to the sphere of the self - a bubble of privateness around the individual that 
cannot and should not be invaded without due cause. Such a sphere of separateness from others 
can be invaded either by unwarranted physical contact (such as unauthorized treatment or 
continued futile medical treatment) or by uninvited intrusion into the sphere of psychological 
integrity that individuals create for themselves. In the context of genetic information, it is 
submitted that spatial privacy can be invaded by the revelation of genetic data about an individual 
to that self-same individual, if there is no indication that the individual would want to know such 
information. This cannot appropriately be seen as an informational privacy issue because this 
latter privacy interest concerns the interest in maintaining non access vis-à-vis third parties. In 
the example under discussion, the concern is revelation of information about oneself to oneself. 
Informational privacy focuses on the control that an individual can exercise over his/her 
personal information. Spatial privacy protection cannot focus on control of information because 
its domain is the maintenance of a state of ignorance, wherein information is unknown and 
therefore beyond the reach of any meaningful exercise of control. One cannot control that which 
one does not know to exist. 
The justifications for this two-fold conception of privacy are numerous. First, the 
conception of what is private in lay terms accords to a high degree with the view of privacy 
advocated in this work.77 This is important because it goes a long way to helping us formulate a 
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view of the law that can address actual social needs. Moreover, this definition pinpoints interests 
that already are recognized by privacy laws in the United States, yet which are currently under-
protected, as will be demonstrated presently.  
Second, to define privacy as a state rather than a right or a claim helps us to describe the 
concept while at the same time avoids imputing value to it. As has been noted, privacy is defined 
as a state of separateness from others, be that society in general, the family, or other individuals.  
This is not to say that others cannot enter that sphere, nor that individuals simply can act 
howsoever they would wish when in such a sphere, nor that such a state necessarily protects 
undesirable activities. Rather, it is to say that prima facie a state of privacy places the individual 
apart from others.78 Yet, merely to say that I am apart from others will not always lead us to 
conclude that I am in a state of privacy. For example, if I am marooned on an island, then I am 
certainly apart from others, but few of us would say that I have privacy. This is in part because 
privacy implies something more than mere isolation, which can be seen as undesirable. To be in a 
state of privacy, one must be in a context where there are others from whom one can be 
separate. On a desert island this is not possible for one is alone. This is isolation, which implies a 
state of enforced non access to others. Privacy, on the other hand, is a state that easily can be 
relaxed or maintained because it occurs in a social setting. Isolation concerns the removal of 
individuals from a social context and therefore cannot accurately be described as privacy.79
By corollary, simply because I am in the presence of others does not necessarily mean 
that I cannot claim privacy interests. For example, an aspect of spatial privacy is the interest in 
maintaining bodily integrity. It is not because I am in a crowd that unwarranted interferences 
with my bodily integrity are not offensive and cannot be classed as invasions of privacy. 
Intentional contact with my person by another easily can be seen as an invasion of privacy. 
However, incidental touchings are a necessary and obvious part of entering a crowded public 
forum and could not reasonably be treated as an invasion of privacy.80 Similarly, one would not 
say that one’s privacy interest in not being observed is invaded by being in a crowd. Arguably, in 
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such cases, one has consented to a degree of observation or physical contact - that which flows 
directly and naturally from one’s presence in the public sphere.81 This having been said, if one’s 
movements were to be recorded clandestinely, then a strong argument could be made that this 
does indeed infringe privacy interests. There is a considerable difference between the anonymity 
of the crowd and the specific identification of an individual within a crowd. In the former case, 
any observation which occurs is merely incidental and readily can be anticipated by the individual 
in question. If, however, one is being clandestinely observed, then one cannot reasonably 
anticipate being the focus of someone else’s attention. Moreover, one becomes a means to 
someone else’s end: a factor which, in itself, is offensive and disrespectful of the individual.82 The 
specificity of the information obtained by recorded observation is an additional factor that 
differentiates the two experiences. In like manner, the specificity of detail that can accompany 
genetic test results, and the implications the use of that information can have for those identified, 
should serve to heighten our privacy concerns.  
Fourth, to describe privacy as a state and therefore to seek to offer a neutral description 
of the concept of privacy does not preclude us ultimately from attributing value to such a state. 
Nor does it prevent us from seeking to accord (legal) protection to such a state for the good 
ends that it can further and for the interests it can protect. It already has been argued that a state 
of separateness can protect good ends - both private and public. But, in essence, such a state can 
be seen as one in which the interests of the individual are paramount. If one chooses to accord 
respect and protection to such a state, then this is evidence of a degree of commitment to 
valuing individuals. But, the obvious question which arises from this is, why should we seek to 
protect such a state of privacy when we already have mechanisms for respecting individuals and 
protecting their interests? The response is that such existing mechanisms cannot always provide
adequate protection. Furthermore, the concept of privacy advanced here allows us to recognize a 
broad range of interests that might otherwise go unrecognized. To view privacy either as solely 
concerned with personal information, or to argue that autonomy or confidentiality (or, indeed, 
liberty) can adequately protect privacy interests is to fail to protect important interests and to 
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miss many interesting nuances. This having been said, one criticism that might be levelled at the 
view of privacy presented here is that it confuses privacy with concepts such as autonomy, 
confidentiality or even liberty. For example, a state of separateness implies a state of non-
interference which is arguably simply one definition of liberty or freedom. Similarly, it might be 
argued that the state in question is one which depends largely on the notion of autonomy - the 
individual as self-ruler. This would be an important criticism and even if it were not raised in 
respect of the definition of privacy advanced here, the relationship between privacy and these 
related concepts must nevertheless be examined.     
D. Privacy and Related Concepts
Many writers associate the beginning of legal interest in privacy in the United States with 
the seminal article by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, published in the 1890-91 volume 
of the Harvard Law Review.83 From such humble beginnings was born the tort of invasion of 
privacy.84 Warren and Brandeis examined cases drawn from areas as diverse as defamation,85
breach of confidence,86 and copyright,87 and concluded that the common law recognised 
common interests in each of these actions which could be subsumed under the rubric of a 
general right to privacy.88 This they classified as a “right to be alone”.89 For present purposes, it is 
neither intended to praise90 nor particularly criticize91 this work, but rather to offer it as an 
illustration of a common problem which arises in the field of privacy study; namely, conflation of 
concepts and confusion of terminology. The association of privacy with the “right to be alone” 
has been made by many writers since Warren and Brandeis,92 and all have been subject to the 
same criticism: by conceiving privacy to be a “right” to be free from intrusion or interference 
they have equated privacy with liberty. This is not only confusing generally, but for those who 
seek to argue positively about privacy it can have adverse consequences. For example, Fried has 
recognised that “to present privacy only as an aspect of or an aid to general liberty is to miss 
some of its most significant differentiating features”.93 Similarly, Posner has observed: “[W]e 
already have perfectly good words - Liberty, Autonomy, Freedom - to describe the interest in 
39
being allowed to do what one wants (or chooses) without interference. We should not define 
privacy to mean the same thing and thereby obscure its other meanings”.94
E. Conflation of Concepts
Today, privacy is protected in the United States at a number of different levels and by a 
number of different means.95 Central among these are the common-law right, of which Warren 
and Brandeis were the progenitors and to which we shall return presently, and the Supreme 
Court’s creation: the Constitutional Right to Privacy. This latter has been much criticised ever 
since it was “interpreted out” of the Constitution by the Court in 196596 in Griswold v Connecticut.97
Once again, however, one major criticism which is frequently voiced is the alleged confusion of 
‘privacy’ with ‘liberty’. Parent, for example, argues:
“The defining idea of liberty is the absence of external 
restraints or coercion. A person who is behind bars or locked 
in a room or physically pinned to the ground is unfree to do 
many things. Similarly, a person who is prohibited by law from 
making certain choices should be described as having been 
denied the liberty or freedom to make them. The loss of liberty 
in these cases takes the form of a deprivation of autonomy. 
Hence we can meaningfully say that the right to liberty 
embraces in part the right of persons to make fundamentally 
important choices about their lives and therewith to exercise 
significant control of different aspects of their behaviour. It is 
clearly distinguishable from privacy, which condemns the unwarranted 
acquisition of undocumented personal knowledge.”98
Parent’s is of the opinion that all of the United States constitutional privacy cases 
“conflate the right to privacy with the right to liberty”.99 While one might not agree with his 
particular definition of privacy, his point on confusion of concepts is, nevertheless, a valid one. 
Wagner DeCew offers the following explanation: “Given early association of a legal right to 
privacy as a right to be let alone and the well-known explanation of a concept of negative liberty 
in terms of freedom from interference, it is hardly surprising that privacy and liberty should 
often be equated”.100
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There is, however, an additional problem which stems from the fact that although one 
may accept wholeheartedly that privacy and liberty, as defined by Parent, are completely separate, 
it does not necessarily follow that the two concepts raise issues wholly unconnected with each 
other.  Furthermore, as DeCew points out in relation to the case law, “it is not at all clear that 
Parent has shown that the constitutional privacy cases involve no ‘genuine’ privacy interests”.101
Clearly, however, the two concepts are by no means synonymous. As DeCew herself 
states, it is simple to show how one's notion of privacy can be shown to be distinct from that of 
liberty. The example she gives is where one's privacy is being constantly invaded by surreptitious 
surveillance, of which one is unaware, thereby having no effect on one's liberty. To this one 
could add the example of genetic testing where information is gathered about oneself from 
family members when one is wholly ignorant of the fact. Both of these examples involve 
invasion of one's private sphere yet entail no impingement on one's liberty. DeCew comments: 
“While the word ‘privacy’ could be used to mean freedom to live one's life without governmental 
interference, the Supreme Court cannot so use it since such a right is at stake in every case. Our 
lives are continuously limited, often seriously, by governmental regulation”.102
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected this idea.103  However, we can once 
again accept that while this particular conflation of privacy with liberty might be wrong, this does 
not necessitate that we reject completely the possibility of a relationship between the two 
concepts. Just as Wagner DeCew gives examples of privacy issues that do not involve liberty, and 
vice versa, she equally talks of autonomy examples which exclude all mention of privacy.104  She 
qualifies this immediately, however, by acknowledging that,
“a subset of autonomy cases, however, certain personal 
decisions regarding one's basic lifestyle, can plausibly be said to 
involve privacy interests as well. They should be viewed as 
liberty cases in virtue of their concern over decision-making 
power, whereas privacy is at stake due to the nature of the 
decision. More needs to be said about which decisions and 
activities are private ones, but it is no criticism or conflation of 
concepts to say that an act can be both a theft and a trespass. 
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Similarly, acknowledging that in some cases there is both an 
invasion of privacy and a violation of liberty need not confuse 
those concepts”.105     
What a defense of privacy can do, however, is protect some forms of liberty - principally those 
relating to the personal sphere of individuals' lives. The same is true for autonomy, and, in the 
case of personal information, this can be said of confidentiality too. Many commentators who 
concern themselves with the concepts of liberty or autonomy face problems of conceptual 
confusion, difficulty of definition, and ambiguities of scope. Beauchamp and Childress, for 
example, point out that autonomy is terribly conceptually confused and “not a univocal concept 
in either ordinary English or contemporary philosophy”106. Dworkin similarly considers a 
plethora of definitions of autonomy offered by writers in that field almost none of which is in 
conformity with any another.107 And Berlin has noted in the context of liberty that: “Almost 
every moralist in human history has praised freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature 
and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems 
able to resist”.108
As a way through this conceptual mire it is helpful to recognize that notions such as 
liberty, autonomy and privacy are interrelated. Indeed, one could go as far as to say that they are 
interdependent, each one relying on  the other to fulfil its true function in the best possible 
way.109 Consider the impossibility of making autonomous choices without a degree of freedom 
from interference.110 Consider the residual value of liberty if one’s life choices are never 
respected. And, consider whether it is feasible to be truly free or fully autonomous without some 
sphere of the private? Liberty and autonomy cannot properly fulfil their function or potential in 
protecting individuals and their interests without a concomitant commitment to a respect for 
privacy. Each of these concepts performs the same function, albeit in different ways: each 
represents an expression of the fundamental respect which a liberal society has for its citizens. 
Yet, each is also open to criticism as ill-defined, anticommunitarian and conceptually obfuscated. 
Accordingly, these reasons are insufficient in themselves to deny a healthy respect for privacy.  
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This having been said, it might be that we see liberty and autonomy as ends in 
themselves rather than as means to an end, while we may view privacy purely as a device to 
achieve a certain end. Even so, it is submitted that it is not necessary to show privacy to be a 
fundamental and ultimate value of itself in order to argue validly for its protection.  Furthermore, 
as Gavison points out:
“Privacy has as much coherence and attractiveness as other 
values to which we have made a clear commitment, such as 
liberty. Arguments for liberty, when examined carefully, are 
vulnerable to objections similar to the arguments. . .[against] 
privacy, yet this vulnerability has never been considered a 
reason not to acknowledge the importance of liberty, or not to 
express this importance by an explicit commitment so that any 
loss will be more likely to be noticed and taken into 
consideration”.111
Gavison argues that the case for an explicit commitment to privacy is made by pointing 
out the distinctive functions of privacy in our lives. Are there, then, specific functions for privacy 
to perform over and above a general support for other concepts such as liberty and autonomy? It 
has been argued thus far in this article that this is indeed the case in the context of genetic 
information. We have seen how concepts such as autonomy and confidentiality do not, and 
cannot, address the concerns and interests that surround the availability of genetic information. 
Moreover, it is submitted that, while the Constitutional right to privacy and the common law tort 
of invasion of privacy reflect the interests that are protected by the view of privacy described 
above, these conceptions of privacy are currently inadequate in their protection of such interests. 
Thus, for example, it might be argued that the interest protected by the Constitutional right 
corresponds to a spatial privacy right, in that it affords individuals a zone of personal space into 
which the state cannot intrude without adequate justification. The development of this right has 
been hampered, however, by the piecemeal nature of court jurisprudence, and by the 
inconsistencies of the Supreme Court itself in recognizing the parameters of the interest it 
believes it is protecting.112 Moreover, the right in question is good only against the state, and 
would not provide any horizontal protection vis-a-vis other individuals. Most importantly, 
towards the end of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court signalled a rejection of privacy as the key 
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value under which Constitutional rights of individuals in the health care context are to be 
protected, preferring instead liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.113 For these reasons, the 
notion of a Constitutional right of privacy is an inappropriate means to protect the spatial 
privacy interests in genetic information. Nonetheless, the history of jurisprudence of such a right 
demonstrates well the recognition of the need for adequate protection of interests of this sort. 
Relatedly, one might speculate on the common law right of privacy as a means of 
protecting informational and spatial privacy. As a right in rem, this privacy right is good against 
the world at large, and so is unlike the right of confidentiality, which must be owed specifically 
and voluntarily to one individual or group of individuals.114 We can test the efficacy of this 
privacy right by applying it, once again, to our imaginary scenario. The relatives might, for 
example, claim that an invasion of their privacy had occurred if certain uses of the information 
were employed, either by the health care professional, or arguably, Nicola herself. But can this 
vision of privacy protect the interest in not knowing? Of the four subsets of the privacy tort that 
have been identified,115 the most appropriate might be public disclosure of private facts or 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. The first of these, however, would only 
assist if the information were revealed, as with confidentiality, to third parties outside the familial 
relationship, and no interest would be infringed if the women themselves were told the news. 
With respect to unreasonable intrusion, it might be thought that the offensive intrusion could be 
the receipt of burdensome information, but a perusal of the case law does not bear this out as a 
means of constituting the tort. Rather, an element of intentional invasion of private space is 
required, which is bound up with the possibility that personal information will be acquired or 
removed from that space by unacceptable means, rather than, as with our concern, that personal 
information will be added to that personal space.116 Thus, the tort is constituted when an illegal 
search of one’s property is carried out,117 or when one’s home is physically invaded,118 or when 
eavesdropping or spying occurs,119 or even when one is the subject of harassing telephone calls.120
There is no authority to suggest that an actionable tort is committed by adding private 
information to the private sphere. It would seem that the conceptual underpinnings of the tort 
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do not encompass such an invasion. Thus, the common law right of privacy cannot help to 
establish a valid legal basis for a right not to know information. The focus of the tort on the need 
to extract information from the private sphere (usually with a view to placing it in the public 
sphere121) renders it ill-equipped to protect against such intrusions into the private sphere as 
occur when an interest in not knowing is compromised. The parallel that might be drawn then, is 
that the common law tort is more akin to an informational privacy right, and not a spatial privacy 
right.
These conclusions about current privacy protection in the United States should not lead 
us to the belief, however, that pursuing further privacy protection is a fruitless task. Rather, as 
has been argued above, there can be considerable value in recognizing the importance of 
protecting privacy. The definition of privacy proposed in this article finds its roots in moral 
notions about individuality, and presupposes social norms, such as respect for individuals. In this 
it is allied with the related concepts of autonomy, confidentiality and liberty, for all of these 
concepts perform essentially the same function - to define how individuals are perceived and 
treated in western society and to establish and maintain the boundaries between the individual 
and society. Moreover, these concepts are necessary adjuncts to a view of human dignity and 
respect that  is prevalent in our society. To see privacy in such terms allows one to comprehend 
better why a state of separateness should be sought. It further allows us to put forward valid and 
legitimate reasons for arguing that such a state should be protected and that invasion should only 
be on legitimate grounds and for legitimate reasons. Below, a more specific defense of privacy is 
presented, which applies the definition here advanced to the genetic information scenario 
outlined above to show that privacy in se can best protect the interests involved. 
VII. A RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: A PRIVACY PERSPECTIVE
A spatial privacy analysis underscores a right not to know information. If, in the context 
of a dilemma about whether someone should be told, the individual has no knowledge at all that 
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familial information exists, then the spatial privacy interest stands as a prima facie bar to the 
person being approached and told the information. Spatial privacy requires that, before such an 
approach is made, we consider how the individual might be harmed by disclosure and what 
good, if any, might come from disclosure. It requires that we reflect on the act of disclosure and 
places the onus on us not to disclose unless faced with compelling reasons to do so. Finally, it 
goes some way to ensuring that the decision-maker does “not rest content with assumptions that 
flow from preconceived value preferences”.122 That is, a privacy analysis reveals the broader and 
more complex reality of scenarios involving genetic information. This does not happen when we 
analyze the problem from the perspectives of autonomy or confidentiality. As we have seen, 
autonomy is susceptible to argument for autonomy enhancement through disclosure of 
information. On the other hand, confidentiality permits wide exceptions – such as the 
amorphous public interest - whereby disclosure can easily be justified at the discretion of those in 
possession of confidential information and when the value judgements of those persons dictate 
when information is so disclosed.123
Thus, in the circumstances of our scenario, Nicola must consider the privacy interests of 
her female relatives in not knowing the familial genetic information. It has been argued from the 
perspective of autonomy that Nicola could approach her relatives with the news of her own 
condition and let them decide for themselves whether they should do something about 
discovering their own genetic composition. From the perspective of privacy, however, Nicola 
must seriously consider the spatial privacy interests of her relatives. This might lead her to 
conclude that the information should not be imparted, for example, in the case of the sister who 
is unlikely to take advantage of the cure available because she is phobic about operations, or the 
cousin who is likely to react badly to the information given that she is prone to bouts of 
depression. 
Our spatial privacy analysis provides Nicola with a more sophisticated model than is 
currently available from either of the concepts of autonomy or confidentiality with which to 
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determine how she should proceed with the news about her condition. It is undeniable that this 
is a paternalistic stance. It cannot be otherwise in the absence of more information about what 
the relatives would want. Yet, such a paternalistic approach must be accepted for what it is and 
not be eschewed automatically in favor of an autonomy-enhancing disclosure. While autonomy-
based arguments tend to create an imperative to let the individual make the personal choice, too 
frequently this amounts to an abrogation of responsibility on the part of the discloser of the 
information; for, with the passing of the information goes too the responsibility for assisting in 
how the information should be used. But, the transference of the burden of decision does not in 
itself absolve the first party of his or her moral obligations to the recipient of the information. 
And, because of the susceptibility of autonomy to value-laden enhancement or facilitation 
arguments, it is often overlooked that decisions to enhance the autonomy of another are just as 
paternalistic as decisions not to disclose information at all. 
What should happen in the case of a refusal based on limited knowledge? For example, 
if Nicola’s cousin, Norma, was known to have expressed a disinclination to know her own health 
status when she was aware of the family history of disease, should she nevertheless be told? In 
these circumstances we have an indication that an individual might not wish to know 
information. Autonomy indicates that we should respect such a wish and a spatial privacy 
analysis gives us another good reason to do so. It is accepted that a privacy analysis does not 
necessarily make it easier for us to respect a wish not to know if that wish seems irrational (for 
example, if a cure for the condition is available and yet refusal is still made) but, it does give us all 
the more cause to reflect that the refusal should be respected nonetheless. In addition, while 
autonomy-based arguments can be undermined because the subject in our scenario is not in full 
possession of all material facts to enable her to make a truly autonomous decision, a privacy 
paradigm offers a prima facie starting point of noninterference, which places the onus of 
justifying disclosure firmly on the shoulders of those who would do so.
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None of the above should be taken as suggesting that disclosure should never be made. 
Rather, it is offered as a model for reevaluating the information disclosure decision-making 
process, and for considering the weight and merit of a range of factors in deciding if, when, and 
in what circumstances, a disclosure should be made. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that 
hypotheticals rarely translate easily into real-life situations. It is acknowledged that, in a family 
context, it is very difficult to keep matters secret or private. Also, faced with the prospect of 
death, many would consider that everyone would wish to know of a predisposition to disease, no 
matter how upsetting the knowledge. This article cannot adequately address such issues. But, the 
point to be made is that the privacy analysis advanced here can be seen as a reflection of a wider 
trend in medicine and the care of others. The principle of sanctity of life is no longer seen to be 
the governing value in health care. Quality of life has taken over that role. And, acceptance of 
this requires many paradigm shifts. If it were thought that the supreme value were to save life at 
all cost, then subtle privacy issues such as those advanced here would not arise. If, however, one 
values quality of life and accepts that we might prefer quality to the mere continuation of life, 
then this requires us to acknowledge that individuals might have an interest in preserving their 
current quality of life, even if that comes at the cost of life itself. The privacy model suggested 
here provides us with one way of seeking to respect such an interest.
Further utility for this model can be found when claims to have access to familial genetic 
information come from outside the family context. The requests of employers or insurers that 
individuals undergo genetic testing can be seen as an invasion of privacy given that these 
individuals are required to know information about themselves that they might not otherwise 
discover or seek out. In the balance of interests that could be undertaken, it would be hard to 
justify the promotion of the interests of employers and insurers – being primarily financial – over 
the significant personal spatial privacy interests of individuals that might be compromised by 
such requests. While the focus of this article is the family unit, this brief example demonstrates 
the potential extension of our privacy model to other areas. It is a sphere that require 
considerably closer examination. 
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VIII. WHAT KIND OF GENETIC PRIVACY RIGHT SHOULD THERE BE?
If the above arguments are accepted, and the current legal protection of privacy rejected 
as inadequate, then the question that arises is, what kind of privacy right should there be? We can 
approach this question from several different perspectives. On the one hand, we can consider 
other means within the existing law for recognising these privacy interests. This could be in one 
of two ways: (1) by the refusal to impose any duty to disclose through the law of negligence, (2) 
by recognizing or creating a common law duty not to disclose. Alternatively, we could 
contemplate the introduction of a new statutory right of privacy specifically designed to protect 
the privacy interests in question.
A. No Duty to Inform
The negligence action has been used widely in tort law to delimit the extent of the duty 
of care that a physician owes to patients. Occasionally, however, a duty is deemed to be owed to 
persons outside the therapeutic relationship,124 and, in such circumstances, the courts rely heavily 
on policy arguments to shape and temper such extensions of the law. The beginnings of a trend 
to extend the duty of care to relatives of persons diagnosed with genetic disease can be discerned 
in a number of states. Thus in Pate v. Threlkel,125 the Florida Supreme Court specifically addressed 
the question: “Does a physician owe a duty of care to the children of a patient to warn the 
patient of the genetically transferable nature of the condition for which the physician is treating 
the patient?” In answering this question in the affirmative, the court concluded that:
“. . .when the prevailing standard of care creates a duty 
that is obviously for the benefit of certain identified third 
parties and the physician knows of the existence of those third 
parties, then the physician’s duty runs to those third parties…a 
patient’s children fall within the zone of foreseeable risk.’126  
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It was at pains to stress, however, that the duty did not require that relatives be 
approached directly by the physician: “the duty will be satisfied by warning the patient”.127
This view is unsatisfactory as a matter of policy for two reasons. First, it says nothing 
about the nature of the physician’s duty if the patient refuses to disclose to relatives. Second, it 
assumes that the interests of patient and relatives necessarily coincide. For example, one can 
foresee circumstances in which it might not be in a patient’s interests to be told that he or she is 
dying of a genetic condition, yet a failure to do so would be a breach of the physician’s duty to 
the patient’s relatives. The two duties of care are not, therefore, always reconcilable. 
A 1996 decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey has addressed at least the first of 
these problems. In Safer v. Estate of Pack,128 the court refused to follow the Florida court’s 
restriction of the duty, and “declin[ed] to hold…that, in all circumstances, the duty to warn will 
be satisfied by informing the patient”.129 The court continued: “It may be necessary, at some 
stage, to resolve a conflict between the physician’s broader duty to warn and his fidelity to an 
expressed preference of the patient that nothing be said to family members about the details of 
the disease”.130 Here, the court contemplates preferring a physician’s duty of care to third parties 
to the patient’s right to confidentiality. That it does so at least recognises that the physician’s duty 
of care to those third parties is separate from the relationship the physician has with the patient 
(albeit that it might have its origins in that relationship). Furthermore, it recognizes that the 
requisite standard of care should come from the physician and should not be discharged merely
by telling the patient about his or her condition.  
But, even if this line of authority is thought to be persuasive,131 the fundamental premise 
for extensions of this sort in tort law should not be forgotten; namely, that public policy 
considerations must dictate the future course of the negligence action. It is for the courts to 
decide this matter, and a number of factors have a direct bearing on whether such an extension 
should be made. Several considerations should be immediately apparent, such as the burden that 
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a duty would place on health care professionals,132 the difficulty in knowing who should be 
contacted and how,133 and the possible detrimental effect that such a duty would have on the 
physician-patient relationship if confidentiality can be disregarded in favor of the duty to 
disclose.134 But, of most importance in the present context, the courts should not rely 
unquestioningly on an assumption that nondisclosure is necessarily a (legal) harm. 
As has been argued above, the interest in not knowing can be very important, and it will 
not be served by imposing a duty on health care professionals to make disclosures without first 
considering the consequences, both for the patient and the patient’s relatives to whom disclosure 
will be made.  One way, therefore, to recognize and protect the interest in not knowing would be 
refuse to endorse the extension of tort law to impose a duty to disclose. The problem with such 
an approach is that it leaves the matter of the recognition of spatial privacy interests to the 
judiciary, which can only recognize such interests as and when relevant disputes come to court. 
Also, and more importantly from the individual’s perspective, such an approach does not accord 
any right of compensation to those who have had their privacy interests invaded. It merely acts 
to pay abstract lipservice to the interests in question.
B. A Duty Not to Inform
An alternative means to enshrine a right not to know in law would be to make an 
unauthorized disclosure a cause of action leading to the payment of damages, either for 
consequential harm or, simply, because the privacy of the individual had not been respected. As 
far as the common law is concerned, however, the analysis carried out above has shown that the 
primary concern of the privacy tort is with informational privacy interests and not spatial privacy 
interests. It is, thus, ill-equipped to be developed along such lines, absent some act of 
unprecedented judicial activism. Thus, in the absence of a viable alternative at common law,135
any right to compensation would henceforth require to be introduced by statute at the state or 
federal level. 
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During the 105th Session of Congress, 110 bills seeking to protect genetic privacy were 
introduced. None was debated beyond the sub-committee stage.136 And, while a number of states 
have taken the initiative to introduce protective measures,137 no federal initiative has ever been 
successful. Yet, as Starr has pointed out: “Almost everyone agrees that the absence of stronger 
protections for the privacy of health data is a national problem and that this problem has become 
more urgent in recent decades”.138 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 set a deadline of August 21, 1999 for Congress to enact federal health privacy legislation, 
but this deadline passed without action. In default, the Act empowers the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to introduce privacy regulations. A proposed rule on 
privacy was instituted on 3 November 1999, and the period for public comment closed on 17 
February 2000.  At the time of writing, no regulations have been instituted. In this period of 
inaction and uncertainty, it is therefore apposite to look for inspiration to model federal 
legislation designed specifically to address genetic privacy concerns.139
C. The Genetic Privacy Act
The Genetic Privacy Act (GPA) was produced for the Human Genome Project's 
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues division by George Annas, Leonard Glantz and Patricia Roche of 
Boston University’s School of Public Health.140 This draft model law is in the format of a federal 
statute and has already been a source of inspiration for several state legislatures141. 
The introduction to the Act states:
[T]he overarching premise of the Act is that no stranger should 
have or control identifiable DNA samples or genetic 
information about an individual unless that individual 
specifically authorizes the collection of DNA samples for the 
purpose of genetic analysis, authorizes the creation of that 
private information, and has access to and control over the 
dissemination of that information. 
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Thus, the GPA envisages a highly individualistic approach to the question of control of 
genetic samples and information. It should be noted, however, that the GPA defines the term 
"private genetic information" to mean
any information about an identifiable individual that is derived 
from the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation of a gene or 
genes, or the presence or absence of a specific DNA marker or 
markers, and which has been obtained; (1) from an analysis of 
the individual's DNA; or, (2) from an analysis of the DNA of a 
person to whom the individual is related142. 
This clearly seeks to take account of the interests that relatives of a “sample source” can 
have in genetic information. And yet, the GPA gives a property right in the DNA sample to the 
sample source.143 Moreover, it is not clear how well the distinction is drawn between a DNA 
sample and private genetic information derived from a sample.144 Axiomatically, the first is 
unique and personal to the person from whom the sample was taken. The same is not true of the 
information, but the GPA nevertheless provides that the exclusive right over such information 
(as with samples) is retained by the sample source.145 The provisions of §101(b)(8) stipulate, 
however, that, prior to the collection of a DNA sample from individuals they should be 
informed, among other things that “the genetic analysis may result in information about the 
sample source's genetic relatives which may not be known to such relatives but could be 
important, and if so the sample source will have to decide whether or not to share that 
information with relatives”.146
It is fortunate that the text of the GPA is accompanied by a commentary prepared by its 
authors in which they seek to clarify their general aims and to expand upon the specific terms 
contained therein. Of the above provision, they say the following:
“Creating either a contractual or statutory obligation for 
individuals to share [genetic] information with their family 
members would not only be unprecedented, but inadvisable. 
The creation of new substantive rights or duties of family 
members is not our intention and is beyond the scope of this 
Act. However, because the Act creates rules that govern the 
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use and disclosure of information, it is imperative that 
individuals be informed of the fact that by seeking genetic 
information about themselves through genetic analysis, they 
may also become privy to information about other family 
members who would also want and/or need such 
information...[w]hile it will be an individual choice as to 
whether or not to share that information with others, this 
disclosure should instigate discussion between the sample 
source and the collector of the sample”.147
Thus the GPA allows sample sources to decide for themselves whether to disclose 
genetic information to relatives. Many would argue that this is not necessarily a bad thing 
because often such a person will be better (or even best) placed to establish how relatives might 
feel about receiving such information. However, the GAP does not give any guidance to a 
sample source on how to decide whether or not disclosure should be made. In particular, there is 
no recognition of the possible spatial privacy interests which relatives who are the potential 
recipients of such information might have in not knowing. If it is accepted that individuals can 
have valid interests in such notions, then it is submitted that an Act that purports to deal with 
genetic privacy should include provisions aimed at recognizing and protecting such interests.
The only part of the GPA to recognize such interests is that concerned with minors.  
Section 141 of the Act provides as follows:
(a) INDIVIDUALS UNDER 16 -- …the individually 
identifiable DNA sample of a sample source who is under 16 
years of age shall not be collected or analyzed to determine the 
existence of a gene that does not in reasonable medical 
judgment produce signs or symptoms of disease before the age 
of 16, unless :
(1) there is an effective intervention that will prevent or delay 
the onset or ameliorate the severity of the disease; and
(2) the intervention must be initiated before the age of 16 to be 
effective; and
(3) the sample source's representative has received the 
disclosures required by section 101 of this Act and has 
executed a written authorization which meets the requirements 
of section 103 of this Act and which also limits the uses of 
such analysis to those permitted by this section.
The authors justify these provisions as follows:
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There are two reasons for this prohibition on the exercise of 
parental discretion. First, if someone learns that the child is a 
carrier of a gene that disposes the child to some condition later 
in life, this finding may subject the child to discrimination and 
stigmatization by both the parents and others who may learn of 
this fact. Second, a child's genetic status is the child's private 
genetic information and should not be determined or disclosed 
unless there is some compelling reason to do so.148
This corresponds to arguments that have been made above concerning the spatial 
privacy interests of individuals. Arguably, the GPA here recognizes the spatial privacy interests of 
children, and further, it recognizes that these should not be invaded without due cause.149 The 
GPA is remiss, however, in not recognizing the spatial privacy interests of all persons about 
whom genetic information is known but who have not sought it out themselves. 
Of course, the situation of the minor is not in all respects the same as that of the adult 
relative of a proband. One clear point of difference concerns the initial generation of 
information. In the case of the minor, the legal prohibition concerns the initial collection or 
analysis of genetic material. In the case of an adult relative of a proband, this is not the point at 
issue because no one can (or should) prevent others from having their genetic material analysed. 
This is, however, a distinction without a difference for present purposes. For, the essential issue 
in both cases is the same; namely, the unwarranted intrusion of personal genetic information into 
the private sphere of the individual in question. Thus, the interest of the adult relative is not in 
seeking to control the proband's access to the information, but rather it is in having his or her 
own spatial privacy interests of non intrusion respected. For the minor, precisely the same 
interest is at stake. The means to protect the child’s interest may lie in securing control over the 
minor’s own sample, but simply because the same means are not available to relatives of a 
proband should not lead to the conclusion that the spatial privacy interests of the proband’s 
relatives are any less deserving of protection.   
Relatedly, because the minor is the proband in such cases, the minor has the primary 
right to decide what happens to his or her genetic sample and to any genetic information derived 
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from that sample. Given this, one might argue that the above provisions simply ensure that the 
choice of accessing genetic information be left until the child is capable of making independent 
choices. And so, one might conclude that no specific provision is necessary in the case of an 
adult because it is axiomatic that the adult may choose to know or not to know his or her own 
information. However, the question here is not simply one of access, but also one of non access. 
The interest is not merely one of control but of maintaining a state of ignorance: a state of non 
access to the person. Yet, the focus of the GPA on control of samples (and so on autonomy and 
choice) means that the child is only protected from attempts to gain specific access to personal 
genetic information. The minor is not protected from unwarranted disclosure of genetic 
information from relatives. Adults are in an equally vulnerable position. In fact, one can draw a 
clear parallel between the child and the unknowing adult in that, in many senses, they are both 
incapax with respect to the genetic information. While the child is generally incapax, the adult 
can certainly make a choice to know, in that the adult has the capacity to choose to know. But, to 
offer the individual the opportunity to choose might be to offend the very interests with which 
one is concerned. Thus, it is submitted that it is acceptable in the case of genetic information to 
adopt the position that both adult and child are incapax. The consequence of this is equally the 
same, namely, that neither should be approached with unsolicited disclosures of genetic 
information without due cause and justification. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that it would not be inappropriate to extend the form of 
protection offered by the GPA to relatives of a proband. The prohibition on disclosure could 
not only cover requests for direct testing, but also could extend to unwarranted approaches to 
family members with genetic information about which they are unaware. The determination of a 
warrantable approach would need to be settled by more debate on the legitimate nature of 
competing interests and a proper assessment of genetic risks and consequences within the family 
and the wider community setting. In this way a spatial privacy right could be established which 
would require proper justification before a legally acceptable approach to a person could be 
made.
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D. Privacy Problems
A well-defined spatial privacy right could embody a clear account of the kind of factors 
that would make disclosure in different circumstances acceptable or unacceptable. These factors 
have been described above as: (1) the availability of a cure or therapy; (2) the severity of the 
condition and likelihood of onset; (3) the nature of the genetic disease; (4) the nature of the 
genetic testing; (5) the nature of the request; (6) the question of how the individual might be 
affected if subjected to unwarranted information, and whether the individual has expressed any 
views on receiving information of this kind.
An obvious problem with this approach, however, is that the existence of a right not to 
know implies that a duty not to disclose information should exist in certain cases. Yet, an 
important factor in determining whether such a duty exists is the question of how the individual 
to whom the information is to be disclosed might react. This is a very subjective matter that can 
be especially difficult for any third party to assess. It leads to the possibility that individual A 
might determine that individual B should not be informed of information, when in fact 
individual B actually would want to know, had she or he been given the opportunity. As we have 
seen, the privacy argument in favor of non disclosure is based primarily on a desire to respect 
and not to harm the individual, but in such a case the very fact of non disclosure might cause
harm and might be an act of disrespect in itself. In recognition of this, a number of additional 
factors could be brought to bear on the problem.
First, an objective assessment of circumstances could serve to delimit the parameters of 
any duty not to disclose. That is, the person in possession of the information would assess 
factors such as likelihood of onset and availability of cure, together with an objective 
consideration of what a person in the subject’s position would or would not want to know. Such 
a reasonable subject could assume the particular characteristics of the actual subject. At the end 
of the day, provided that the assessment was a reasonable one, one could conclude that no legal 
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redress should lie against someone who had decided (not) to disclose information. The relevance 
of any views of the subject clearly would be significant in the assessment of reasonableness, as 
would the extent of the effort made by the duty-holder to seek out evidence of those views.  
None of this detracts from the fact that the assessment of the factors to be considered is 
in itself a difficult exercise. On the one hand, the clinical data concerning the extent of risk or the 
likely success of therapy or cure are best assessed by health care professionals, while the question 
of which characteristics should be taken into account to determine if this subject should be told, 
is better determined by those close to the person, such as the subject’s relatives. And, while a 
health care professional might be in a position to gather a range of data to assist in the 
assessment of the situation, it is far less clear whether family members are in a position to make 
meaningful assessments of such factors, let alone whether they should be the subject of a legal 
action if they disclose information in unjustified circumstances. 
It is therefore submitted that it is more permissible to impose a duty not to disclose or 
seek information on parties outside the family milieu, or at least to require that they do so only in 
the most justified of circumstances. Primarily, this would affect employers, insurers, and the 
state. Thus, for example, requests for genetic testing by such parties would be seen to be a clear 
invasion of spatial privacy. This does not mean, however, that the range of interests under 
consideration, or their importance, should not be discussed with individuals who seek genetic 
testing and who might contemplate disclosure to their relatives. It is simply to admit that the law 
does not always have a role to play in determining what should be done with genetic information, 
especially within the family setting. Nonetheless, it could become a duty for health care 
professionals to discuss such interests with probands. The GPA requires, for example, that a 
number of matters be discussed with a sample source.150 To this list could be added a specific 
requirement in respect of the interest of relatives in not knowing.  
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An additional defining factor for a duty not to disclose could be the need to show the 
reasonable prospect that a tangible benefit would come to the person to whom disclosure would
be made. The benefit should be more than the facilitation of preparedness or the promotion of 
autonomy, and should represent some clinical benefit to the subject. Thus, for example, 
employers and insurers would not be able to rely on the argument that individuals can choose 
whether or not to undergo testing at their behest, but rather would have to show some real 
medical benefit to those persons to justify their requests for testing and/or access to genetic 
data. Also, state screening initiatives would be justified only if such a benefit could be shown.151
Health care professionals similarly could be obliged to discuss with probands the likely real 
benefits of disclosure to relatives.  
Third, even if all of the above is accepted, a concern may remain: is this approach not 
simply a paternalistic assessment of spatial privacy interests? To an extent it is, but perhaps this 
can never be avoided in circumstances where one cannot approach an individual directly to 
determine how to proceed. Rather, it is submitted that the worth of this approach is found in its 
responsiveness to broader, less atomistic interests. It is an approach that does not view the 
beginning and the end of ethical discourse as lying with the autonomy of individuals, but rather 
responds to the wide range of interests from the perspective of an ethic of care, wherein 
autonomy has a significant role to play, but where privacy is also required to complete the model.    
Finally, as Powers has rightly pointed out, “. . .a commitment to privacy rights does not 
entail a commitment to absolute rights”.152 Indeed, in the context of genetic privacy there are 
many reasons why this cannot be so, not least of which is the fact that we are dealing with a 
plethora of privacy (and other) interests stemming from the familial nature of the information in 
question. What, then, might the limits and exceptions to privacy protection be? Some of these 
already have been discussed above. In addition, it is difficult to reject the argument that public 
interest is a valid exception to such a right, just as it is a determining factor in the law of 
confidentiality. The classic paradigmatic tension is that between the public interest in protecting 
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private interests (such as privacy and confidentiality) and the protection and promotion of other 
public interests (such as protection of the community from harm, or freedom of the press). 
However, the devil is in the detail of determining what is meant by public interest in each case. 
A number of well-accepted public interests are self-evident and certainly would be 
included in any genetic privacy legislation. These include the prevention and detection of crime, 
scientifically valid and ethically justified research and court ordered disclosures.153 Public health 
initiatives aimed at particular populations similarly might be justified where, for example, tangible 
harm can be avoided by effective screening and treatment. Screening of newborns for 
phenylketonuria and hypothyroidism is acceptable on such grounds.154 In each of these examples,
the public in question is the community at large. But does this definition of public necessarily 
exhaust the concept? More specifically, when we ask who is the public in the genetic privacy 
public interest exception?, should this include the family of persons who have been tested for 
genetic conditions? 
A public is a collective defined, like society, by reference to the individual. Relatively 
speaking, the individuals in a family unit might constitute a public by virtue of the fact that, as a 
common collective with a common interest in familial information, they have claim to the 
information in question. However, this is not to suggest that a familial public necessarily has the 
same common interest in the information,155 for as we have seen, a number of potentially 
competing interests may be in play. Nor is it to suggest that a familial public, by virtue of its 
strength of numbers alone, should have an automatic or strong(er) claim to the information in 
question, as compared to the person who is the original source of the information. The balance, 
were there to be one, would need to be between the familial public interest weighed against 
another public interest, such as the interest in respecting individual privacy generally, or the 
public interest in protecting individuals from potentially harmful uses of their personal 
information.
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This view of a collective familial claim presupposes, of course, that a familial public 
interest could be formulated. No comment is offered here on this point. While such a 
communitarian approach to privacy and genetic information scarcely has been contemplated,156 it 
is a self-evident and natural corollary to the recognition of the range of claims surrounding this 
sort of information. If the family is to come to be seen as community in microcosm, then the 
collective claims and interests of that community also must be determined and weighed in any 
balance of values when assessing the appropriateness of any dealings with familial genetic 
information. 
This article has sought to argue for recognition of one small area of this new field; 
namely, the interest not to know. But, if this thesis is accepted, and a paradigm shift is 
undertaken, which refocuses attention away from purely mono-individualistic, autonomy-based 
concerns, then the relevance of other similar claims also falls to be considered. While it has not 
been appropriate to do so in this article, the interconnectedness of the disparate elements of this 
discourse must ultimately be fully explored to determine the optimal role for the law within such 
a dynamic. At no point, however, should we dismiss the notion that the role of the law might, in 
fact, be limited in a complex domain such as this.      
CONCLUSION
The need to address privacy issues in the field of genetics has been appreciated by a 
number of international bodies in a number of international documents. For example, the Bilbao 
Declaration highlights the main problem areas likely to arise from the work of the Human 
Genome Project and pinpoints matters considered to be worthy of immediate attention by the 
legal systems of the world. Included in this Declaration is “[p]rotection of the personal privacy or 
confidentiality of genetic information, and determination of cases in which it could feasibly be 
altered or overstepped”.157 Moreover, the interest in not knowing has been recognized. For 
example, the Council of Europe in its Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, states in 
Article 10(2): “Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health. 
However, the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be observed”.158 Similarly, the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights states in Article 5c “[that t]he 
right of every individual to decide whether or not  to be informed of the results of genetic 
examination and the resulting consequences should be respected”.159 These instruments embody 
the best and the worst features of the dilemma that we currently face. They recognize the value 
of an interest which has hitherto received short shrift, but they offer mere aspirational means to 
protect this interest, which is without substance in the absence of specific national interventions. 
Furthermore, while these instruments recognize the value of rights-based discourse, they 
subsume the protection of the interest in not knowing within a rubric of rights of autonomy and 
choice, when these constructs are ill-suited to the task at hand. Thus, while these documents 
offer a new way of looking at genetic information, they represent only one means of addressing 
the problem - one that is typical of the current focus on autonomy-based argument.
This article has argued for an original concept of privacy that would provide recognition 
and protection of the interest that individuals might have in not knowing genetic information 
about themselves. Furthermore, it has offered a view as to how such an interest could be 
protected by legal means within a domestic system. The argument has been as much about 
identifying the problem and the most appropriate tools to use to solve the problem, as it has 
been about offering concrete means to address all of the nuanced issues that arise. It is as much 
an appeal to view the problem from an alternative perspective, as it is an offer of a solution to 
the dilemmas at hand. And, just as the solution offered is not without its problems, so the reader 
is invited to reflect that the current approach yields little by way of solution.     
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